CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 294

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THE FOREIGN SECRETARY agreed that there was no acceptable alternative

to continuing with our present policies for Rhodesia; at the same time we must do everything possible in the United Nations to ensure that existing economic sanctions were made more effective. Otherwise we should face attempts by countries who were not themselves enforcing these sanctions to widen their scope in ways that would harm us and not themselves.

We must also seek to persuade South Africa to bring pressure to bear on the

illegal regime.

In discussion there was general agreement that we could not

contemplate using force to bring down the illegal regine or policies which

would involve a confrontation with South Africa. Nor, at the other

extreme, could we accept a settlement on any terms that were likely to be

acceptable to the illegal regine at the present time since these would

not accord with our principles and declared policy. In any event

Mr. Smith lacked the authority to reach a settlement on terms which would

involve anything more than a token gesture of a return to legality. Te

could not expect the Rhodesian situation to remain unaltered as a result

of the Commonwealth Secretary's visit to Africa; it would either improve

or worsen. The main risk that we faced was that the effect of economic

sanctions would progressively weaken and that, even if we were to succeed

in making existing sanctions more effective, this would only be achieved

at great cost to us in international goodwill without succeeding in

bringing down the regime; although we would nevertheless press for action,

particularly in the United Nations, to tighten economic sanctions, we

should not count on success. There were grounds for thinking that, in

some Commonwealth countries in Southern Africa, a lack of confidence in

the success of our sanctions policy was leading to a decline in morale

and to a fear that the end-product of our policy would be apartheid in

Rhodesia and a threat to their own existence. They might therefore become

more willing to accept a compromise solution in Rhodesia. Even if these

attitudes were not strongly held at present, they might grow with time,

particularly if we were to prepare the way for a compromise settlement.

If we did not believe that economic sanctions on a scale which we could

afford would succeed, we should seek to follow policies which would

minimise the damage to us of their failure; it would not be in our

interests to attempt to strengthen sanctions if it was clear that they

would not succeed, since this would nerely add to our losses; it would

be reinforcing failure.

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